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Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click 
at a Time 
Thaddeus Hoffmeister* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the eyes of many attorneys, the trier of fact, not the evidence 
presented, is the key factor in determining the outcome of a trial.1  Thus, 
attorneys have long sought to learn as much as possible about those 
deciding the fate of their clients.2  While information has been readily 
available about judges who have established reputations and regularly 
decide cases,3 one cannot say the same for jurors who are randomly 
drawn from the community to hear one case.  Traditionally, attorneys 
had to expend significant time and resources to discover information 
about jurors.4  The Digital Age, however, has changed this. 
Attorneys can now discover information about jurors in seconds or 
minutes as people place more and more personal information online.5  
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; editor of 
www.juries.typepad.com, a blog dedicated to the study of juries.  The author would like to 
acknowledge the excellent work of his research assistant Mike Porter on this Article.  This Article 
also benefited from thorough editing by the staff of the Kansas Law Review.  Of course, any errors 
or mistakes in this Article are solely the responsibility of this Author. 
 1. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & A. Brian Threlkeld, Probing “Life Qualification” 
Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2001) (“The conventional wisdom 
is that most trials are won or lost in jury selection.”); Steven C. Serio, Comment, A Process Right 
Due?  Examining Whether a Capital Defendant Has a Due Process Right to a Jury Selection Expert, 
53 AM. U. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2004) (“Many scholars believe that most capital cases are won or 
lost during jury selection.”). 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. See Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 
899 (1997), and vacated sub nom. Collins v. Welborn, 520 U.S. 1272 (1997) (“There are 
prosecution-minded judges, and defense-minded judges . . . .”); see also History of the Federal 
Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2011) (providing biographical information on all federal judges).  Many states have similar 
websites.  See, e.g., Judicial Directory, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/ 
judges/directory.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 51–59. 
 5. See, e.g., Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (discussing the ease by which information about jurors may be discovered in light of 
technological advances); see also Stephen P. Laitinen & Hilary J. Loynes, A New “Must Use” Tool 
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The speed and ease by which information about jurors is now discovered 
online has led attorneys to increasingly investigate and research jurors.6  
In fact, the practice has become fairly commonplace, with courts,7 
practitioners,8 and state bar associations9 all approving and encouraging 
its use.  One prominent trial consultant has even claimed that “[a]nyone 
who [does not] make use of [Internet searches] is bordering on 
malpractice.”10  While this may somewhat overstate the importance of 
investigating jurors online, it demonstrates just how routine the practice 
has become in certain areas of the country.11 
Like with other aspects of litigation, the online investigation of jurors 
raises a few concerns.12  Some view the practice as overly intrusive 
because it allows attorneys to learn things about jurors that would rarely, 
if ever, come up or be discussed during voir dire.13  For example, judges 
generally prohibit attorneys from questioning a potential juror during 
                                                                                                                       
In Litigation?, FOR THE DEF., Aug. 2010, at 16, 16 (“People are putting more and more personal 
information on the Internet.  In the United States, no less than 35 percent of adult Internet users and 
66 percent of Internet users under the age of 30 have a profile on a social networking site.”). 
 6. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1688–94 (2008) (discussing the market that has arisen for 
jury consultants and the effect technology has had on the voir dire process). 
 7. See McCullough, 306 S.W.3d at 558–59 (holding that courts should allow parties 
reasonable time to research prospective jurors); Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 
3448071, at *9–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam) (discussing approvingly 
the use of the Internet by attorneys to gather information about prospective jurors during voir dire), 
cert. denied, 13 A.3d 363 (N.J. 2011) (table decision). 
 8. See Julie Kay, Social Networking Sites Help Vet Jurors, LAW TECH. NEWS (ONLINE), Aug. 
13, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202423 
725315&slreturn=1 (discussing the views of attorneys on the use of the Internet to investigate 
prospective jurors); Jack Zemlicka, Social Distortion, WIS. L.J. (May 10, 2010), 
http://wislawjournal.com/2010/05/10/social-distortion/ (“Since the explosion of social networking, 
[one Wisconsin attorney] regularly researches jurors and monitors their online activity during 
lengthy trials.  [As this attorney explained,] ‘It’s not unusual for someone in my office to run the 
name of a juror, if we get them ahead of time, through Google, Twitter or Facebook.’”). 
 9. See NYCLA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 743 (2011) (discussing a lawyer’s 
investigation of jurors’ Internet and social networking postings during the course of a trial). 
 10. Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty?  May Want to Edit Online Profile, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2008, at A6 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11. Some trial consultants offer “personality profiling” of jurors based on Internet research.  
Julie Kay, Vetting Jurors Via MySpace, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 11, 2008, at 1. 
 12. See Jamila A. Johnson, Voir Dire: To Google or Not to Google, 5 GPSOLO LAW TRENDS & 
NEWS: LITIG. (2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_ 
news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/litigation_johnson.html (describing how researching jurors 
online could rise to the level of jury tampering or improper influence if an attorney is not careful). 
 13. See NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 82–83 (2005) (“For example, lawyers have 
sometimes wanted to ask prospective jurors about their religion or sexual orientation during voir 
dire, but judges have usually denied such inquiries on the ground that it is an intrusion into the 
juror’s privacy and not necessary for the parties to know.”). 
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voir dire about her political ideology or voting history.14  By going 
online, however, the attorney may discover a juror’s past political 
contributions or current political affiliations.15 
In addition to privacy concerns, questions arise surrounding full 
disclosure.  Some believe that an attorney—depending on his interest in 
the dispute—may withhold certain disqualifying juror information from 
the court or opposing counsel.16  Consider a recent example from 
Michigan.17  Before the second day of a two-day criminal trial, a sitting 
juror posted the following on her Facebook account: “[A]ctually excited 
for jury duty tomorrow.  It’s gonna be fun to tell the defendant they’re 
GUILTY.”18  The defense discovered this posting prior to the start of the 
second day of trial and the court promptly dismissed the juror.19 
One may easily envision a different outcome had the prosecutor 
discovered the information.  A different defense attorney also might have 
taken an alternative approach to resolving this problem.  Rather than 
report the misconduct to the judge and request dismissal of the juror, the 
defense attorney might have approached the prosecutor about a mid-trial 
plea deal20 or used the information to revamp her trial strategy.  As this 
Article will explain, most attorneys do not have a legal or ethical 
obligation to turn over information about jurors.21  In addition, juror 
information is generally outside the scope of discovery.22 
                                                          
 14. See, e.g., Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411–15 (1895) (describing questions 
related to political affiliation and stating they were properly excluded during voir dire). 
 15. Several mainstream websites offer information about campaign contributions.  See, e.g., 
Campaign Donors: Fundrace 2012, HUFFINGTON POST, http://fundrace.huffingtonpost.com (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2011) (providing an interactive map that allows users to search by a person’s name or 
location for campaign contributions). 
 16. Correy Stephenson, Should Lawyers Monitor Jurors Online?, LEGALNEWS.COM (Dec. 27, 
2010), http://www.legalnews.com/macomb/1004089 (noting that one attorney “expressed concern 
that some attorneys might fail to disclose information they learn about a juror—keeping it in ‘their 
back pocket’ in case of an unfavorable verdict—and then use the information to seek a new trial”). 
 17. Jameson Cook, Facebook Post Is Trouble for Juror, MACOMB DAILY, Aug. 28, 2010, 
http://www.macombdaily.com/articles/2010/08/28/news/doc4c79c743c66e8112001724.txt. 
 18. Id. (errors in original). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Mid-trial pleas or pleas right after jury empanelment occur in some instances.  See, e.g., 
Barry Leibowitz, Muslim Convert Admits He Murdered U.S. Soldier, Plea Avoids Death Penalty, 
CBS NEWS (July 25, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20083191-
504083.html (“Abdulhakim Muhammad pleaded guilty in the middle of his trial to capital murder 
and attempted capital murder charges.”). 
 21. See infra Part IV.B (discussing attorneys’ obligation to disclose disqualifying juror 
information). 
 22. See infra notes 253–55 and accompanying text (noting the narrowness discovery of juror 
information). 
HOFFMEISTER FINAL 4/19/2012  2:13 PM 
614 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
The abovementioned example also illustrates that online juror 
investigations—unlike traditional investigations—now occur at various 
stages of trial.  Further, attorneys today engage in the practice for reasons 
beyond just jury selection23 or identification of biased or unfavorable 
jurors.24  Some attorneys use the practice in an effort to create a bond 
with the jurors.  For instance, an attorney who discovers through her 
online investigation that a juror closely follows sports might incorporate 
athletic references or metaphors in the courtroom to better connect with 
that juror. 25   Other attorneys, who find themselves on the losing side at 
the end of trial, use the practice to look for appealable issues.26  For 
example, an attorney might search a juror’s blog or social networking 
site hoping to discover an inappropriate remark or comment made to or 
by the juror during trial.27 
While much has been written about obtaining juror information 
through in-court voir dire,28 little has been offered about out-of-court 
methods like juror investigations.  The legal academy has virtually 
ignored the topic of juror investigations.  This author is aware of only 
one major academic work solely dedicated to this area of law in the past 
forty years.29  One may attribute this dearth of scholarship, at least in  
                                                          
 23. This Article uses the term “jury selection.”  It should really be called “jury de-selection” 
because neither party has an affirmative right to empanel certain jurors.  For a discussion on the 
theory of affirmative jury selection, see generally Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A 
Proposal to Advance Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161. 
 24. See Kay, supra note 8 (“Some jury consultants and lawyers, however, still want to research 
their juries even after jury selection, for different reasons.  For one thing, the information can be 
used to get a case overturned on appeal if it turns out a juror lied on a questionnaire.  Additionally, 
some consultants and lawyers are beginning to use Internet information [they have] obtained about 
jurors to influence them during the trial, particularly during closing arguments.”). 
 25. See id. (noting that a lawyer might analogize to a juror’s affiliations or interests to gain 
sympathy). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra notes 129–38 and accompanying text (citing examples of juror misconduct 
through blog posts). 
 28. See, e.g., Thomas J. Hurney Jr. & Randal H. Sellers, Picking Juries: Questionnaires and 
Beyond, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 370, 370–71 (2008) (discussing the use of questionnaires during in-court 
voir dire); Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and Judicial 
Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 515–17 (2008) (discussing jurors’ 
self-assessments of fairness during voir dire). 
 29. Joshua Okun, Investigation of Jurors By Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 
GEO. L.J. 839, 840 (1968).  The issue, however, has received attention in material targeting 
practitioners.  See, e.g., EUSTACE CULLINAN & HERBERT W. CLARK, PREPARATION FOR TRIAL OF 
CIVIL ACTIONS 78–82 (3d ed. 1956) (advocating the use and legality of juror investigations); Jeffrey 
T. Frederick, You, the Jury, and the Internet, 39 BRIEF, Winter 2010, at 12, 16–18 (“The Internet is 
also a source for information on potential jurors for jury-selection purposes.”); Clarence W. Heyl, 
Selection of the Jury, 40 ILL. B.J. 328, 333 (1952) (describing methods of juror investigation); 5 AM. 
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some part, to the fact that over the past decades the practice of 
investigating jurors has occurred less frequently.30 
The Digital Age, however, has reversed this trend.  The Internet has 
resurrected the practice of investigating jurors.31  Thus, there is a 
growing need for more research and study on this topic to better 
understand its impact on the legal system and society as a whole.  This 
Article attempts to fill the current void by taking an in-depth look at 
online juror investigations. 
In Part II, this Article offers an overview of juror investigations by 
attorneys.  Here, the Article focuses on the evolution of the practice.  In 
Part III, the Article examines the benefits of the practice to both the legal 
system and attorneys.  This Part demonstrates that more information 
about jurors improves the jury-selection process and reduces the 
likelihood of juror misconduct. 
Part IV addresses the two main drawbacks associated with 
investigating jurors: juror privacy and full disclosure.  In discussing juror 
privacy, this Article challenges the notion that the current methods of 
investigating jurors are overly intrusive.  This Article then examines the 
issue of full disclosure and identifies it as an area ripe for reform.  
Finally, this Article, in Part V, analyzes two proposals that would require 
attorneys to reveal certain information discovered about jurors to either 
the court or opposing counsel. 
II. THE PROCESS 
A. Historical Approach 
Obtaining information about jurors outside of the traditional voir dire 
process and prior to trial is not a new concept.32  The idea has been 
around for quite some time.  As far back as 1708, the English Treason 
Act stated that “when any Person is indicted for High Treason . . . a 
List . . . of the Jury mentioning the Names[,] Profession[,] and Place of 
                                                                                                                       
JUR. Trials § 4, at 253 (1966) (instructing practitioners on methods of pretrial investigation of 
jurors). 
 30. LISA BLUE & ROBERT B. HIRSCHHORN, BLUE’S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION § 9:1 (C. 
Joseph Miles et al. eds., 2004) (“Drive-bys can be a valuable tool, but they seem to have fallen out of 
favor.”). 
 31. Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for Lawyers, 28 TRIAL ADVOC. 
Q., Spring 2009, at 12, 13–14. 
 32. Commonwealth v. Allen, 400 N.E.2d 229, 236 (Mass. 1980) (“The practice of permitting 
counsel to acquire information about prospective jurors in advance of trial . . . is long established.”). 
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Abode of the . . . Jurors [shall] be also given at the same Time that the 
Copy of the Indictment is delivered to the Party indicted.”33  In 1770, 
Blackstone commented about the practice of providing juror information 
to certain defendants.34 
Borrowing from the English, American colonialists also afforded 
defendants early access to information about jurors in select cases.35  In 
1790, Congress passed the Public Acts of the First Congress, which 
included provisions that gave defendants facing capital or treason 
charges the right to access and investigate the jury venire list at least 
three days before trial.36  The purpose of the statute was twofold.  First, it 
“put the defendant on an even plane with the government in preparing for 
his defense by giving him the names of the attending jurors.”37  Second, 
the statute provided the defendant the opportunity to discover 
information about potential jurors.38 
By the twentieth century, many attorneys became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the limited information that courts provided and started 
investigating jurors on their own.  Both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys engaged in the practice,39 and courts generally approved of the 
tactic.40  During the 1907 trial of Henry Thaw, “detectives in the employ 
of the District Attorney and of the defense” conducted extensive searches 
into the backgrounds of prospective jurors.41  These detectives looked 
into each potential juror’s life, habits, reputation, and standing in the 
community.42 
                                                          
 33. Treason Act, 1708, 7 Ann., c. 21, § 14 (Eng.). 
 34. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *351–52. 
 35. See Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 902–03 (Pa. 2007) (highlighting the similarities 
in treatment of juries between the English tradition and early American law). 
 36. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 118 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3432 
(2006)).  Some states have similar statutes.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 66 (West 
2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604:1 (2001); see also United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 640 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1976) (“The laws of many of the states provide for the release of lists of persons 
selected for jury duty prior to trial . . . .  By rule of court in some of the Federal circuits and by 
Federal statute a more limited right of access to jury lists exists.”), rev’d, 4 M.J. 118 (C.M.A. 1977). 
 37. Stewart v. United States, 211 F. 41, 46 (9th Cir. 1914). 
 38. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *355 (stating that “the panel [of jurors] is 
returned to the court upon the original [writ of] venire, and the jurors are to be summoned and 
brought in many weeks afterwards to the trial, whereby the parties may have notice of the jurors, and 
of their sufficiency or insufficiency, characters, connections, and relations, that so they may be 
challenged upon just cause”). 
 39. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 149–50 (2003). 
 40. Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 71 N.E. 292, 294 (Mass. 1904). 
 41. JONAKAIT, supra note 39, at 149 (quoting F.A. MACKENZIE, THE TRIAL OF HARRY THAW 
210 (1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. 
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Renowned attorney Clarence Darrow placed great emphasis on jury 
selection and relied on investigators to learn about prospective jurors.43  
In the trial of Bill Haywood, both Clarence Darrow and the prosecution 
“were amply equipped with precise intelligence gathered during the 
massive effort both sides had expended to compile the preferences, 
affiliations, and dirty little secrets of hundreds of potential jurors.  Both 
sides had sent small armies of scouts into the countryside posing as 
insurance men, encyclopedia salesmen, and other itinerants.”44 
During the 1920s, Professor Clarence N. Callender, as part of an 
overall study of jury-selection methods in Philadelphia, examined juror-
investigation methods utilized by members of the Philadelphia bar during 
both civil and criminal trials.45  The Philadelphia City Solicitor and 
District Attorney relied on the local police, while private litigants turned 
to detectives and companies that specialized in juror-investigation 
services.46  For a fee, these companies provided attorneys with 
background information on prospective jurors.47 
Regardless of whether an attorney used law enforcement, a private 
investigator, or a juror-investigation service, the information gathered 
about prospective jurors during this time period was typically the same.48  
For example, a standard list of questions used by Philadelphia 
prosecutors in the 1920s asked about the potential jurors’ political and 
religious affiliations, marital status, reputation in the community, 
drinking and other morality-reflective habits, employment status, and  
                                                          
 43. GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW 179–80 (1993). 
 44. JONAKAIT, supra note 39, at 149 (quoting J. ANTHONY LUKAS, BIG TROUBLE: A MURDER 
IN A SMALL WESTERN TOWN SETS OFF A STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA 527 (1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. CLARENCE N. CALLENDER, THE SELECTION OF JURORS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
METHODS OF SELECTION AND THE PERSONNEL OF JURIES IN PHILADELPHIA AND OTHER CITIES 27–
30 (1924). 
 46. Id. at 28–30.  Modern companies offer similar juror-investigation services.  See, e.g., Pantos 
v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489, 491 (1984) (considering the propriety of a 
juror-investigation service’s request for information about prospective jurors). 
 47. Pantos, 198 Cal. Rep. at 491; Okun, supra note 29, at 851 n.46 (citing MELVIN M. BELLI, 1 
MODERN TRIALS § 116 (1954)); see also Dow v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414, 430 (3d 
Cir. 1955) (discussing the operations of companies that investigate jurors); Melvin M. Belli, 
Foreword to WILLIAM J. BRYAN JR., THE CHOSEN ONES, at x (1971) (“In most ‘big cities’ there are 
‘jury services.’  These are like the ‘Winter Book’ at Hialeah[, which handicaps the horses for the 
racing season at the Hialeah racetrack at Florida].  They putatively tell how a juror will ‘run.’  At 
least some information is given as to his religion, his political party, [and] how he voted in other 
cases.”). 
 48. See CALLENDER, supra note 45, at 28–29. 
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criminal history.49  Of course, the attorneys welcomed any other remarks 
or observations from the investigators.50 
Because criminal statutes and ethical rules prohibit direct contact 
with jurors before and during trial, both public and private investigators 
practiced their craft by reviewing jury books,51 researching newspapers 
and public archives,52 consulting other attorneys,53 conducting “drive-
bys” of jurors’ residences,54 speaking with neighbors of jurors,55 and 
following jurors throughout the day.56  One may term the last three 
methods as “field investigations.” 
Going to a prospective juror’s residence yielded information about 
the juror’s general lifestyle and socioeconomic background.57  According 
to one experienced litigator, an attorney “can learn a lot about [potential] 
juror[s] by driving by their house[s] and checking out their home 
environment[: A]re there children’s toys in the yard?  How many cars 
[are] in the driveway?  What make and model?”58  Two prominent jury 
consultants even created a “Drive-by Checklist.”59 
Speaking with a juror’s neighbors or acquaintances offered insight 
into the juror’s “opinions, personal habits, [and] general lifestyle.”60  For 
attorneys looking to strike prospective jurors with certain personality 
traits, this information was of high value;61 however, it came with risks.62  
A primary concern was that the neighbor or friend might inform the juror 
about the questioning.63  This, in turn, could sour the juror on jury 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 28. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Okun, supra note 29, at 852 n.51. 
 52. IRVING YOUNGER, Jury Selection, in THE IRVING YOUNGER COLLECTION: WISDOM & WIT 
FROM THE MASTER OF TRIAL ADVOCACY 311, 335 (Stephen D. Easton ed., 2010). 
 53. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 280 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 54. CATHY E. BENNETT & ROBERT B. HIRSCHHORN, BENNETT’S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION 
AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION § 9.2 (Eda Gordon ed., 1993). 
 55. Commonwealth v. Allen, 400 N.E.2d 229, 238–39 (Mass. 1980). 
 56. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 754 (1929).  The Court actually condemned this 
practice.  Id. at 764–65. 
 57. BLUE & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 30, § 9:1. 
 58. Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court Policies and 
Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18, 22 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. BENNETT & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 54, app. 9A. 
 60. Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J. Stover, The Information Age, Part II: Juror Investigation 
on the Internet—Implications for the Trial Lawyer, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 212 (2001). 
 61. See BENNETT & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 54, § 9.1. 
 62. See BLUE & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 30, § 9 intro. (noting expense, time, and 
psychological impact as potential risks). 
 63. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 400 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Mass. 1980); see also BLUE & 
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service, skew her views of the attorneys, or alter her decision-making 
process in the case.64 
In Commonwealth v. Allen, the court examined the concerns that 
arose when an attorney conducted interviews of prospective jurors’ 
neighbors and friends.65  The trial judge and defense counsel discussed 
the judge’s misgivings with this process at length.66 
 [Trial] judge: “You have conducted interviews in the neighborhoods 
where the jurors were from?” 
 Counsel for [Defendant]: “Yes, your Honor.” 
 [Trial] judge: “Don’t you think that’s extraordinarily dangerous?” 
 Counsel for [Defendant]: “Well, your Honor, I think that, 
understanding our responsibility and reviewing the statute and reading 
what authority granted us to exercise our discretion and—within the 
responsibility of the statute, we carefully made sure we never 
interviewed any jurors, jurors’ families, relatives of any jurors, and I so 
represent.” 
 [Trial] judge: “But wouldn’t the juror know—couldn’t the juror find 
out that you people were investigating her by the interviewee telling her 
or him?” 
 Counsel for [Defendant]: “Quite possibly.” 
 [Trial] judge: “I think it’s highly unethical.”67 
There is also the possibility that a potential juror may be 
unintentionally interviewed, which is exactly what occurred in United 
States v. White.68  In White, a private investigator employed by the 
defendant interviewed neighbors of prospective jurors in an attempt to 
gather information.69  In addition, the private investigator accidentally 
                                                                                                                       
HIRSCHHORN, supra note 30, § 9:6. 
 64. As observed by the jury consultant Robert Hirschhorn, “The juror might then go to the other 
jurors and say, ‘You know what that lawyer did, he investigated me.’ . . . They may think you[] 
invad[ed] their privacy and think ill of you.”  Kay, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 65. 400 N.E.2d at 233–35. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 233. 
 68. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D.S.D. 1999). 
 69. Id. at 1025. 
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spoke with a prospective juror.70  This fact was not revealed until after 
the court empanelled the jury, and the judge ruled that such contact 
threatened the jury’s impartiality and ordered selection of a new jury.71 
Of the field investigation methods employed, tracking or following 
jurors was arguably the most intrusive.  In Sinclair v. United States—the 
only Supreme Court case to date directly addressing juror 
investigations—the Court strongly condemned the practice of tracking or 
following jurors.72  In Sinclair, the trial court convicted the defendants of 
contempt for hiring private detectives to follow the jurors sitting on their 
trial, even though the detectives never contacted the jurors73 and no juror 
had any knowledge of the detectives’ conduct.74 
In upholding the contempt convictions for three of the four 
defendants, the Sinclair Court used extremely harsh language to describe 
the practice of employing detectives to follow jurors.  According to the 
Court, “[t]he most exemplary resent having their footsteps dogged by 
private detectives. . . . The mere suspicion that he, his family, and friends 
are being subjected to surveillance by such persons is enough to destroy 
the equilibrium of the average juror and render impossible the exercise of 
calm judgment upon patient consideration.”75 
Despite the holding in Sinclair, attorneys continued to rely on 
detectives to investigate jurors.76  This is because rather than rigidly 
follow Sinclair, most courts attempted to distinguish it.77  For example, 
some lower courts focused on the timing of the juror investigation.78  
                                                          
 70. Id. at 1025–26. 
 71. Id. at 1026–28. 
 72. 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1929).  In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court briefly discussed juror 
investigations, but it withheld any judgment on the topic.  476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986). 
 73. 279 U.S. at 760. 
 74. Id. at 764.  Most juror investigations, both then and now, are conducted clandestinely.  See 
Kay, supra note 8. 
 75. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 765. 
 76. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 400 N.E.2d 229, 232–39 (Mass. 1980). 
 77. See David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and 
Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36 (1997) (“The strong language of Sinclair rarely has been 
cited, and the next case to consider the impact of the investigation of jurors on their willingness to 
serve, United States v. Costello, reached a conclusion seemingly at odds with the language of 
Sinclair.” (footnote omitted)).  The Second Circuit, in Costello, approved of certain juror-
investigation practices and, so long as the jurors did not discover the investigation, rejected the claim 
that such conduct would create a biased jury.  United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 
1958). 
 78. See, e.g., Dow v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414, 430–31 (3d Cir. 1955) 
(distinguishing use of juror-investigation service, which compiled general information about 
prospective jurors before trial, from constant surveillance of jurors during trial, as occurred in 
Sinclair). 
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These courts more frequently acquiesced to juror investigations that 
occurred prior to the court’s empanelment of the jury.79  Other courts 
concentrated on the purpose of the investigation.  These courts generally 
permitted fact gathering.80  In contrast, investigations with the perceived 
aim of harassing or intimidating jurors were more likely to reach the 
level of those criticized by Sinclair.81 
For most of the twentieth century, juror investigations remained 
relatively static, and the techniques used in the practice continued 
unchanged.82  While the information sought by attorneys expanded 
beyond areas such as the drinking habits of jurors, the same individuals 
followed similar procedures to gather it.83 
Starting in the 1970s, however, the introduction of trial consultants 
changed the practice.84  Private attorneys, especially those with affluent 
or high-profile clients, started to use trial consultants to research and 
investigate not only jurors but also the communities from which they 
were drawn.85  This, in some ways, refined the practice of investigating 
jurors.86  Trial consultants also assisted in giving the appearance, if not 
the reality, that attorneys relied less on hunches and more on scientific 
reasoning during the selection of jurors.87 
One should briefly note that trial consultants do far more than 
investigate jurors.88  In fact, juror investigations are just a small part of a 
                                                          
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 932–33 (2d Cir. 1970); Martin v. United 
States, 266 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1959); Costello, 255 F.2d at 883–84; Best v. United States, 184 
F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950); Allen, 400 N.E.2d at 236–39. 
 80. See Allen, 400 N.E.2d at 237 (finding an “implied right to use reasonable means to gather 
information” about prospective jurors before trial). 
 81. See JAMES J. GOBERT ET AL., JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF 
SELECTING A JURY § 5:1 (3d ed. 2010) (“The appropriate balance appears to be that as long as jurors 
are not intimidated, harassed, or contacted directly, juror investigations may be permissible.”). 
 82. See Okun, supra note 29, at 845–64 (dividing sources of information about jurors into three 
broad categories and explaining techniques used to gather such material). 
 83. See id. (describing the investigative practices employed by both private and government 
attorneys before, during, and after trial). 
 84. See V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 8.06 (3d ed. 2001). 
 85. Diana G. Ratcliff, Comment, Using Trial Consultants: What Practitioners Need to Know, 4 
J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 32, 41 (2002).  This is not to say that prosecutors never use trial 
consultants; they do.  For example, the Maryland State Prosecutor hired a private consultant in the 
trial of Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon.  Annie Linskey & Julie Bykowicz, In Unusual Move, State 
Employs Jury Consultant, BALT. SUN, Nov. 11, 2009, at 1A. 
 86. For an excellent discussion of community attitude assessments and demographic analyses, 
see STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 84, §§ 5.01–6.04. 
 87. Ratcliff, supra note 85, at 32–34. 
 88. Id. at 34. 
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trial consultant’s duties.89  They conduct community surveys, create juror 
profiles, provide mock trials, and offer trial advice.90  Also, many trial 
consultants interpret and analyze juror answers and mannerisms during 
voir dire and throughout the trial.91 
As one might suspect, juror investigations, even with the 
introduction of trial consultants, historically favored the government over 
defendants or private litigants.92  This is true for a variety of reasons.  
First, prosecutors rely heavily on law enforcement to gather information 
about jurors while defense attorneys typically use private investigators.93  
Most citizens are less likely to refuse to speak to a law enforcement 
official as opposed to a private investigator.94  Second, law enforcement 
faces fewer restrictions in obtaining information than do private 
investigators.95  Third, the government has access to information such as 
police databases96 and tax returns97 that are unavailable to the general 
public, including private investigators.  Although it may come as a 
surprise to some, the government has reviewed the tax returns of 
potential jurors in tax-related cases.98   
Fourth, prosecutors, who appear daily in court, are more likely to 
compile data about potential jurors on a regular basis.99  For example, 
many prosecutors across the country maintain so-called juror books or 
“bad juror lists.”100  These contain background information on jurors who  
                                                          
 89. See id. (“[T]he use of consultants has expanded well beyond jury selection, now involving 
all aspects of litigation.”). 
 90. See id. at 39–43 (discussing generally some of the services offered by jury consultants). 
 91. Id. at 42. 
 92. See John B. Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury, 11 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1137, 1154–55 (1978) (“Government attorneys have their own information 
sources. . . . This type of information does give the government an advantage over defense 
attorneys.”). 
 93. See id. at 1154–55 (discussing the government’s use of law enforcement in obtaining 
information about jurors). 
 94. Okun, supra note 29, at 853 (discussing the ease with which an FBI agent may acquire 
information about potential jurors). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 852–53. 
 97. United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 98. Okun, supra note 29, at 867–69 (specifically examining this practice in Costello). 
 99. JONAKAIT, supra note 39, at 150. 
 100. See, e.g., Gene Trainor, Tarrant DA Allowed to Keep ‘Bad-Juror List’ Private, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 23, 2010, at B02. 
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have previously served.101  The information ranges from how the juror 
has decided earlier cases102 to whether the juror has a criminal record.103 
Finally, courts traditionally are less critical of juror investigations 
conducted by prosecutors than those performed by defense counsel.104  In 
reviewing the reported criminal cases examining juror investigations, 
courts rarely question or criticize the procedures used by the 
government.105  Even in Costello—in which the government admitted to 
examining the tax returns of prospective jurors—the court failed to find 
fault with the government’s practices.106  The court in Costello appeared 
to find that selected jurors would welcome a review of their taxes by the 
government or, at the very least, would not be bothered by it.107 
Because of the expense and time associated with juror investigations, 
which only increased after the introduction of trial consultants, the 
practice fell out of favor with most practitioners.  Generally speaking, it 
was reserved for prosecutors,108 high-profile cases,109 or affluent 
                                                          
 101. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 280–81 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 102. Id. at 280. 
 103. See CALLENDER, supra note 45, at 28–29. 
 104. NAT’L JURY PROJECT & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR 
REDUCING PREJUDICE § 3.3(b)(1) (David Kairys ed., 1975) (“Although investigations by prosecutors 
are greeted with more permissive language from courts than defense investigations, the authorities 
acknowledge both the legality and widespread use of juror investigations by all parties.”). 
 105. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 79. 
 106. United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883–84 (2d Cir. 1958).  The court elaborated: 
Appellant further claims that the practice is against public policy in that, once it becomes 
generally known, prospective jurors will be intimidated or will attempt to avoid jury duty.  
These, we incline to believe, are farfetched bogies.  Prospective jurors whose returns are 
vulnerable are the very ones whose elimination is facilitated by the practice: knowledge 
by the others that they were found acceptable to the Government even after an inspection 
of their returns would hardly be conducive to their intimidation.  And the argument that 
the practice will tend to discourage cheerful jury service, if of any force at all in view of 
the mandatory nature of such service, would seem not to apply to those having made 
honest tax returns. 
Id. 
 107. Id.  The court confirmed: 
There would seem to be no good reason to believe that knowledge that jury service 
entails exposure of one’s tax return to the scrutiny of a district attorney would deter a 
good citizen from service in the judicial establishment any more than the fierce publicity 
which beats upon the private affairs of the citizen appointed to high office in the 
executive department deters acceptance of such appointment. 
Id. at 883–84. 
 108. YOUNGER, supra note 52, at 334.  Professor Irving Younger, who once worked as an 
Assistant United States Attorney, explained: 
It’s so expensive, however, that even if you are working for the federal government, 
you’ve got to get clearance from a higher level to do this.  It was called a name check.  
You took the list of 500 or so people summoned for jury duty and three FBI agents sat 
 
HOFFMEISTER FINAL 4/19/2012  2:13 PM 
624 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
defendants.110  Unlike the right to counsel, there is no constitutional right 
to investigate jurors.111  This has not stopped some enterprising defense 
counsel from requesting funds from the court to cover such costs.112 
Juror privacy rights also played a role in the decline of traditional 
juror investigations.  As concerns about juror privacy started to capture 
the attention of judges,113 academics,114 and the public as a whole,115 
certain jurisdictions made it increasingly difficult to investigate jurors 
and were less willing to divulge juror information.116  Some courts 
started to wait until the eve or day of trial to release the names of 
prospective jurors,117 while others stopped publicly releasing jury lists or 
publishing trial dates.118  Also, anonymous juries—which allow courts to 
                                                                                                                       
and ran those names through the central index.  It was before the days of computers, so it 
had to be done manually.  And it took the three agents something like three days.  That’s 
nine man-days—that’s a lot of money. 
Id. 
 109. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 545, 559–60 (1975) (noting use of juror investigations by “political defendants”). 
 110. Id. at 662 (“[B]ecause of his limited means, the poor person cannot obtain the information 
necessary to effect his challenges.”). 
 111. Nor is there necessarily a state statutory right to recover these costs.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 1033.5(b)(4) (West 2007) (“The following items are not allowable as costs, except 
when expressly authorized by law: . . . Costs in investigation of jurors or in preparation for voir 
dire.”); see also Serio, supra note 1, at 1173–86 (recognizing no constitutional right exists but 
arguing that one should). 
 112. Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 501–04 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 113. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 512 (1984). 
 114. See Weinstein, supra note 77, at 3. 
 115. See Michael R. Glover, Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir 
Dire, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 708, 711–13 (1982) (discussing prevailing concerns regarding the privacy 
interest of prospective jurors); see also David Doege, New Policy Seals Jurors’ Names from Public 
Record at End of Trial, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 2, 2002, at 1B (noting that “privacy and 
security” concerns motivated the policy change). 
 116. See Doege, supra note 115, at 1B. 
 117. Generally speaking, there is no right to the jury list.  See Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 
524, 528 (9th Cir. 1959); see also Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 278–79 (9th Cir. 1958) 
(discussing Congress’s implied decision to withhold juror lists in some cases); Seth A. Fersko, 
Comment, United States v. Wecht: When Anonymous Juries, the Right of Access, and Judicial 
Discretion Collide, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 763, 771 (2010) (discussing the Hamer court’s holding 
that a court has the authority to withhold juror lists); Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 19 (“Some 
states, for example, do not allow access to potential juror lists until the day that voir dire 
begins . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., Mark Ballard, House Panel Backs Bill on Juror Listings, ADVOCATE (Baton 
Rouge, La.), Apr. 1, 2010, at A4 (discussing Louisiana legislation that would “drop the requirement 
that newspapers publish the names of jurors and potential jurors”); Teresa Ann Boeckel, Law 
Experts Disagree on Craver Jury Selection, YORK DAILY REC. (Pa.), Sept. 1, 2011, at 01/03 
(discussing secret jury selection in a murder case); Mick Hinton, House Votes to Shut Lists of Jurors, 
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 21, 1993, at 1 (discussing a bill in the Oklahoma legislature that would 
close jury lists from public view). 
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withhold juror names even from the attorneys trying the case—became 
more common.119 
Another reason—though unrelated to juror privacy—for the decline 
of traditional juror investigations was the shorter period of time that 
citizens actually served as jurors.  Historically, jurors typically served for 
extended periods of time.120  This trend began to shift in the latter half of 
the twentieth century as courts in cities such as Los Angeles trimmed 
jury service from thirty days to ten days.121  Thus, it became less 
profitable to research jurors or keep jury books for jurors who only sat 
for one case as opposed to a series of cases.122 
B. Modern Approach 
The Digital Age and its advancements in technology have 
resurrected the practice of investigating jurors.123  With the Internet, 
attorneys no longer need to rely on expensive and labor-intensive field 
investigations to gather information about jurors.124  Today, attorneys or 
their investigators go online and quickly learn information about 
jurors.125 
Online juror investigations take various forms.126  At the most basic 
level, an investigator may perform a name search in a web-based search 
                                                          
 119. Nancy J. King, Essay, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries 
in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 130 (1996); see also Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan 
I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
457, 458–60 (1999) (discussing the use of anonymous juries). 
 120. V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 5.1.02[B] (4th. ed. Supp. 2010) 
(“By the late 1940s and early 1950s, . . . [j]urors usually served on the panel for several months, 
serving on several trials during their service.”). 
 121. Sam Enriquez, Trial Consultants: Experts Seek to Identify Jurors’ Bias, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
27, 1986, § 1, at 1.  “Attorneys and prosecutors once were able to keep track of how jurors voted on 
previous cases by purchasing so-called jury books.  But the books disappeared in Los Angeles after 
the length of jury service was reduced in 1979 from 30 days to 10 days . . . .”  Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Peter Vieth, Internet Juror Research Is Revealing, Trained P.I. Can Uncover Even More, 
VA LAW. WKLY., Nov. 23, 2009, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/2009/11/23/internet-
juror-research-is-revealing-trained-pi-can-uncover-even-more/. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Jocelyn Allison, Tweets Let Attorneys Know When Jurors Misbehave, LAW360 (Oct. 
23, 2009, 4:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/128603/print?section=topnews (listing 
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace as useful tools); Sonia Chopra, Using the Internet and Social 
Media in Jury Selection, PLAINTIFF MAG. (Feb. 2012), http://www.plaintiffmagazine.com/Feb12/ 
chopra_using-the-internet-and-social-media-in-jury-selection_Plaintiff-magazine.pdf (discussing the 
wide array of juror-investigation techniques available because of the Internet). 
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engine.127  For instance, some attorneys handling capital cases have used 
these tactics to discover letters to the editor written by prospective jurors 
about the death penalty.128 
Many attorneys, however, employ far more sophisticated procedures 
that include extracting information from blogs, social-networking sites, 
and online databases.129  In California, a defense attorney discovered that 
a juror deciding his client’s fate had blogged about the case during 
trial.130  On his blog entitled “The Misanthrope,” the juror posted 
photographs of the murder weapon and criticized court staff.131  The 
juror’s blog even encouraged questions about the case from the general 
public.132 
Beyond discovering juror misconduct, attorneys also use online 
investigations in search of tactical advantages.133  For example, a 
plaintiff’s attorney handling a products liability case for a client who 
suffered injury after being forced to enter a machine to clean it 
discovered that a potential juror belonged to an online support group for 
claustrophobics.134  Suspecting that this potential juror would sympathize 
with the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney decided to keep this juror on the 
panel.135  The prospective juror ultimately served as foreman, and the 
plaintiff prevailed at trial.136 
One unique aspect of online investigations, which distinguishes them 
from traditional investigations, is the popularity of the practice with news 
outlets and the general public.  Members of the media now routinely 
investigate jurors in high-profile cases.137  In fact, they have become 
quite adept at uncovering less-than-honest jurors.  In the corruption trials 
                                                          
 127. See Kay, supra note 8. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 19–20.  For a general discussion of various methods of 
investigating jurors online, see Frederick, supra note 29, at 16–18. 
 130. Michelle Sherman, The Anatomy of a Trial with Social Media—The Jury, SOCIAL MEDIA 
LAW UPDATE (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.socialmedialawupdate.com/2010/12/articles/social-
media/the-anatomy-of-a-trial-with-social-media-the-jury/. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Kay, supra note 8. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. This phenomenon tracks the popularity among the general public.  Ellen Lee, Admit it, 
You’ve Googled—Pew Survey Finds Many Have Looked Up Friends on Net, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 
2007, at E1.  In a survey from 2007, researchers found that “36 percent [of participants] said they 
have searched the Web for someone with whom [they have] lost touch, and 9 percent have dug up 
information on someone they were dating.”  Id. 
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of former Illinois Governor George Ryan138 and Baltimore Mayor Sheila 
Dixon,139 the media discovered discrepancies in the information provided 
by several jurors that led to the court taking corrective measures. 
Besides the media, many in society regularly conduct online 
investigations.140  Although they might use the term “research” as 
opposed to “investigation,” the purpose and end result are usually the 
same.  For example, many individuals before or after meeting a new 
person either professionally or socially will use web-based tools—like 
Google or Facebook—to learn more about the individual.141  This type of 
research works because most people have at least one online reference, 
or “footprint,” whether put there personally or by some third party.142 
C. Recent Opinions 
To date, in a very limited number of cases, both courts and bar 
associations have not only approved of online investigations of jurors but 
also encouraged the practice.  In Johnson v. McCullough, the Missouri 
Supreme Court instructed attorneys that preservation of claims of juror 
nondisclosure in civil cases requires that an attorney, at a minimum, 
research jurors on the state’s automated case record system prior to the 
start of trial.143 
Johnson arose out of a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by a 
patient against his physician for negligence in treating a throat 
condition.144  During voir dire, plaintiff’s counsel asked prospective 
jurors whether “anyone [had] ever been a plaintiff or a defendant in a 
lawsuit.”145  Numerous members of the panel answered affirmatively; 
however, one venire member—who was eventually selected to serve—
did not respond.146  After the jury returned the verdict in defendant’s 
                                                          
 138. Michael Higgins, Juror Replacement Is Key to Challenge, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 2006, at 
C13. 
 139. Dennis M. Sweeney, Worlds Collide: The Digital Native Enters the Jury Box, 1 REYNOLDS 
CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 121, 125–27 (2011). 
 140. Lee, supra note 137, at E1. 
 141. Ellen Brickman et al., How Juror Internet Use Has Changed the American Jury Trial, 1 J. 
CT. INNOVATION 287, 294 (2008) (“For many Americans . . . the natural follow-up to meeting a new 
person either socially or in business is to search them on the Internet.”). 
 142. Allison, supra note 126. 
 143. 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 144. Id. at 554. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 554–55. 
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favor, plaintiff’s counsel investigated the juror’s civil litigation history 
by using the state’s automated system and discovered that she “had been 
a defendant in multiple debt collection cases and in a personal injury 
case.”147  Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for new trial, alleging that the 
juror “intentionally failed to disclose her prior litigation experience when 
asked during voir dire.”148  The judge granted a new trial, and the 
defendant appealed.149 
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to 
order a new trial and discussed the responsibility of attorneys to learn 
information about jurors in future cases.150  Specifically, the court found: 
[I]n light of advances in technology allowing greater access to 
information . . . , it is appropriate to place a greater burden on the 
parties to bring such matters to the court’s attention at an earlier stage.  
Litigants should not be allowed to wait until a verdict has been 
rendered to perform [a search on the state’s automated case records 
system] for jurors’ prior litigation history when, in many instances, the 
search also could have been done in the final stages of jury selection or 
after the jury was selected but prior to the jury being empanelled. . . . 
Until a Supreme Court rule can be promulgated to provide specific 
direction, to preserve the issue of a juror’s nondisclosure, a party must 
use reasonable efforts to examine the litigation history . . . of those 
jurors selected but not empanelled and present to the trial court any 
relevant information prior to trial.151 
After the court’s decision in Johnson, Missouri began setting aside time 
to allow attorneys to research jurors prior to the start of trial.152 
Another example of the modern treatment of juror investigations 
arose in Carino v. Muenzen.153  Like Johnson, Carino involved a claim 
of medical malpractice.154  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
physician failed to timely diagnose a brain hemorrhage.155  The New 
Jersey appellate court held that it was permissible for trial counsel to 
research prospective jurors in the courtroom during voir dire even though 
                                                          
 147. Id. at 555. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 558–59. 
 151. Id. 
 152. MO. SUP. CT. R. 69.025. 
 153. No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 13 A.3d 363 (N.J. 2011) (table decision). 
 154. Id. at *1. 
 155. Id. at *3. 
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the attorney conducting the research did not provide advance notice to 
the court and opposing counsel was unable to conduct similar research.156 
Approximately one year before the start of the Carino trial, the New 
Jersey court system issued a press release announcing that it would begin 
offering Wi-Fi in the courthouse to “maximize productivity for 
attorneys.”157  Plaintiff’s counsel took advantage of the new Wi-Fi 
capability by researching jurors on his laptop during voir dire.158  
Defense counsel, who did not have a laptop, objected to plaintiff’s 
research.159  The trial judge sustained the objection, finding that 
plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide notice to either opposing counsel or 
the court regarding his intent to conduct such research.160 
The appellate court held that the trial judge had acted unreasonably 
in prohibiting plaintiff’s counsel from using his laptop to research 
jurors.161  The appellate court, however, did not overturn the jury’s 
verdict favoring the defendant because the plaintiff failed to identify “a 
single juror who was unqualified or as to whom he claims he would have 
exercised a peremptory challenge, even though he has subsequently had 
the opportunity to perform an internet search concerning each juror.”162 
In addition to opinions by state courts, local bar associations have 
also weighed in on the topic of attorneys’ researching jurors online.  
Recently, the New York County Lawyers Association (NYCLA) stated 
that “[i]t is proper and ethical under [the state’s rules of professional 
conduct] for a lawyer to undertake a pretrial search of a prospective 
juror’s social networking site, provided that there is no contact or 
communication with the prospective juror.”163  When discussing whether 
ethical rules allowed attorneys to investigate or monitor jurors after 
empanelment, the NYCLA was a bit more reserved.164  It concluded “that 
passive monitoring of jurors, such as viewing a publicly available blog or 
Facebook page, may be permissible.”165 
                                                          
 156. Id. at *9–10. 
 157. Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. at *4. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at *10. 
 162. Id. 
 163. NYCLA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 743 (2011). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (emphasis added). 
HOFFMEISTER FINAL 4/19/2012  2:13 PM 
630 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
III. THE BENEFITS OF ONLINE JUROR INVESTIGATIONS 
A. Attorneys 
For a variety of reasons, most attorneys prefer investigating jurors 
online rather than using traditional methods.  First, the Internet offers a 
significant amount of information about prospective jurors.  Some jurors 
have extensive digital trails or Internet footprints.166  With so much 
information available, sorting through it to find something relevant to the 
case at hand is a challenge.167  As demonstrated, however, by the 
attorneys defending Jose Padilla—the so-called Dirty Bomber—it is 
possible, even with a large jury venire, to uncover sufficient information 
to seek dismissal of a potential juror.168 
In addition to the vast amounts of information available, some 
attorneys favor online investigations out of necessity.  Courts have 
reduced the amount of time between when attorneys receive the names of 
jurors and when the court commences voir dire.169  Online juror 
investigations help to relieve these time constraints.170  Even if courts 
wait until the day of voir dire to release the jurors’ names, attorneys may 
begin and finish their online investigations right in the courtroom.171 
Other attorneys prefer online investigations because they require 
fewer resources than traditional field investigations.172  As previously 
discussed, conducting field investigations entails steep financial and 
labor investments, especially with a large jury pool.173  Thus, the average 
criminal defendant could rarely afford the costs associated with 
investigating a jury.174  This, in turn, expands the representation inequity 
between affluent criminal defendants and those with limited economic 
                                                          
 166. See Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 17–18 (discussing the various sources of 
information available online). 
 167. See id. at 19 (discussing limited time frames as one such challenge). 
 168. Id. at 18. 
 169. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 170. GOBERT ET AL., supra note 81, § 5:2 (“Furthermore, Internet juror searches may be the only 
form of investigation which is practicable when the identity of the jurors does not become known 
until shortly before trial or at voir dire.  Indeed, Internet searches of jurors can even be undertaken 
while voir dire is in progress.”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See supra notes 39–81 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Babcock, supra note 110, at 561–62 (recognizing the inherent limitations on juror 
investigation facing underprivileged litigants and criminal defendants). 
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resources.175  With online investigations, which require fewer resources, 
cost is less of an issue.176  Attorneys may conduct online investigations in 
even routine cases where clients lack the financial means to support 
traditional investigations.177  Thus, in a way, the Internet serves to level 
the playing field by bringing greater economic equality to the 
representation of criminal defendants.178 
In addition, unlike traditional investigations that attorneys used 
almost uniformly for jury selection, online investigations aid in the 
discovery and prevention of juror misconduct.179  For example, online 
investigations make verifying juror voir dire answers much easier.180  
Historically, attorneys had few methods by which to prove or disprove 
statements made by jurors during voir dire.181  For example, if a juror 
falsely claimed that she did not know any of the parties involved in the 
trial, then the attorney would need to find witnesses or hire a detective to 
prove otherwise.  Today, the attorney may go online to check a juror’s 
voir dire response, which is exactly what occurred in State v. 
Dellinger.182 
In Dellinger, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
overturned the criminal fraud conviction of a deputy sheriff because of 
juror dishonesty.183  The juror in question did not disclose during voir 
dire, despite being asked, that she knew the defendant and had a social 
relationship with the defendant.184  Before the trial started, the juror sent 
the following message to the defendant on a social networking site: 
Hey, I don’t know you very well But I think you could use some 
advice!  I havent been in your shoes for a long time but I can tell ya that 
                                                          
 175. For a general discussion of the utility of juror information in the jury-selection process, see 
Richard L. Moskitis, Note, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir Dire Juror Studies, 49 
S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 600–02 (1976). 
 176. GOBERT ET AL., supra note 81, § 5:4. 
 177. See Internet Juror Research Can Be Revealing, WIS. L.J. (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://wislawjournal.com/2009/11/30/internet-juror-research-can-be-revealing/ (stating that delving 
into jurors’ personal information does not have to be expensive because websites like “Facebook and 
Twitter provide an abundance of useful information about a prospective juror”). 
 178. GOBERT ET AL., supra note 81, § 5:2. 
 179. Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 20. 
 180. See id. at 19 (“[A]n attorney can use social media sites to check the veracity of a potential 
juror’s answers to voir dire questions.”). 
 181. See GOBERT ET AL., supra note 81, § 5:1 (discussing some of the problems faced in juror 
investigations). 
 182. 696 S.E.2d 38, 40 (W. Va. 2010) (per curiam). 
 183. Id. at 39. 
 184. Id. at 40. 
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God has a plan for you and your life.  You might not understand why 
you are hurting right now but when you look back on it, it will make 
perfect sence.  I know it is hard but just remember that God is perfect 
and has the most perfect plan for your life.  Talk soon!185 
The defendant brought this message to the court’s attention after the jury 
rendered a verdict in favor of the state. 186  The defendant claimed that he 
delayed bringing this message forward because he did not initially realize 
that the person he was communicating with was a juror because she only 
used her first name.187 
The enhanced ability to verify jurors’ responses also decreases the 
risk of empanelling a rogue juror.188  According to Professor Bennett 
Gershman, rogue or stealth jurors are those “who seek to inject 
themselves into the [trial] process for self-serving reasons.”189  This is an 
issue of heightened concern with high-profile cases.190  Traditionally, 
these jurors could more easily remain undetected because juror 
investigations provided attorneys with less information than they do 
today.191 
Besides uncovering juror misconduct, online investigations prevent it 
through the monitoring of jurors’ online activities during trial.  At 
present, jurors increasingly violate court rules that prohibit researching, 
blogging, posting, or emailing information about the case.192  As jurors 
learn that counsel may monitor their public, online activities throughout 
the trial—not just during jury selection—they are more likely to adhere 
to the court’s prohibitions for fear of being caught.  One should not 
                                                          
 185. Id. (errors in original). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Jerry Markon, Jurors with Hidden Agendas—Lawyers See Rise in People Who Don’t 
Disclose Bias, Then Seek to Sway Peers, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2001, at B1 (describing the growing 
phenomenon of jurors representing themselves as fair while hiding a bias or motivation). 
 189. Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 
S.D. L. REV. 322, 345 (2005). 
 190. Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 396–99 (1994) 
(discussing the potential problems caused by a self-interested juror working to profit from jury duty 
in high-profile cases). 
 191. Compare Part II.A (discussing the historical roots of and limitations on juror 
investigations), with Part II.B (outlining the modern approach to juror investigation and the breadth 
of information available through online investigations). 
 192. See Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing recent cases that suggest such a 
trend).  For an example of one such court rule, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT 
ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-018-Attachment.pdf. 
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underestimate this benefit in light of the growing number of instances of 
juror misconduct associated with improper online communication and 
research.193 
In one recent study, an English law professor searched the terms 
“Jury Service” and “Jury Duty” on Twitter.194  During a twenty-four-
hour period, he viewed over 200 tweets by individuals who appeared to 
have received a summons to jury duty or actually served as jurors on a 
trial.195  Some of the tweets included information about the individual’s 
experience as a juror.196 
Finally, online investigations help attorneys bond with jurors.197  
Online investigations facilitate this connection by providing attorneys 
with information on issues of specific interest to jurors.198  As explained 
by one seasoned litigator, “a well-placed metaphor in [a] closing 
argument tailored to a juror’s interest or social views as described on 
Facebook or Twitter” can be quite effective.199  Here, of course, the 
attorney must be careful to avoid the appearance of pandering to a 
particular juror.200 
B. Legal System 
It is clear that juror investigations, regardless of the method, provide 
benefits to attorneys.  What is less clear, as this Article explains next, is 
how improving jury-selection methods benefits the legal system and 
society as a whole. 
                                                          
 193. See Denise Zamore, Can Social Media Be Banned from Playing a Role in Our Judicial 
System?, MINORITY TRIAL LAW., Spring 2010, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
litigationnews/practice_areas/minority-jury-social-media.html (noting that the use of social media 
creates problems that can escalate to mistrials). 
 194. Michael Bromby, The Temptation to Tweet—Jurors’ Activities Outside the Trial 1 (Mar. 
25–26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1–2. 
 197. Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 20 (“Attorneys can make use of social media to tailor 
their opening statements and closing arguments. . . . If a juror’s Facebook page reveals that the 
person is a ‘fan’ of a particular environmental group or charity, or that the person is an avid animal 
lover, when appropriate, a savvy lawyer might be able to use analogies or anecdotes to gain 
sympathy for a client.” (citing Kay, supra note 8)). 
 198. Hopkins, supra note 31, at 13. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Kay, supra note 8 (discussing the danger involved with investigating jurors, especially 
if jurors know they are being investigated). 
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For some time, there has been an ongoing debate on whether the 
United States should follow the British example201 and abolish 
peremptory challenges.  Academics,202 legal commentators,203 and 
judges204 have at one time or another criticized peremptory challenges.  
The main objection lodged against peremptory challenges decries the 
method by which attorneys employ them.205  Unlike challenges for cause, 
peremptory challenges allow the removal of a juror despite that juror’s 
impartiality and fairness to both sides.206  Attorneys need not offer any 
reason for using peremptory challenges.207  This, in turn, has led 
attorneys—who often have very little background information on jurors 
besides what they see and hear in the courtroom—to exercise peremptory 
challenges based on outdated stereotypes and hunches premised on a 
juror’s physical appearance.208 
Attorneys with more information about potential jurors are less likely 
to strike a juror solely because of gender or race, which are both 
unconstitutional,209 or physical size,210 which is illogical.  Professor 
Stephen Saltzburg, who has advocated for providing attorneys with more 
information about prospective jurors, has offered insight into the realities 
of jury selection.211  “[M]ost lawyers resort to stereotypes, not because 
                                                          
 201. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118 (U.K.). 
 202. Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still 
Exist?  An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 453 (2000); see also 
Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges: Lawyers Are From Mars, Judges Are From Venus, 3 
GREEN BAG 2D 135, 136 (2000) (“Most law professors don’t like peremptory challenges.”). 
 203. Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 230 (1986). 
 204. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); Raymond J. 
Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 371 (1992). 
 205. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–05 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race). 
 206. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, 
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 170 (1989) (“Peremptory challenges 
ensure the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially advancing 
the goal of making juries more impartial.”). 
 207. Id. at 167–69. 
 208. Id. at 202 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, J., dissenting)). 
 209. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding that “the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause bars the use of peremptory strikes based on race). 
 210. See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 2009).  In Dolphy, a prosecutor used a 
peremptory strike on an overweight African-American woman during jury selection for a trial of an 
African-American defendant.  Id.  The Second Circuit remanded the case for proper application of 
Batson.  Id. at 237, 239–40. 
 211. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Batson and the Straight-Face Test: Courts Split on Gender-Based 
Jury Picks, Permissible Stereotyping, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 82, 88. 
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they want to, but because they have to . . . .  [I have] never met a lawyer 
who would prefer a jury of a particular racial composition over one that 
will win a verdict for him.”212  With the additional information gleaned 
from online investigations, attorneys may exercise peremptory 
challenges more intelligently and within constitutional constraints.213  
Peremptory challenges exercised on facts rather than unproven 
stereotypes give defendants—and society as a whole—greater 
confidence that the legal system functions properly.214 
In recent years, obtaining additional information about jurors through 
traditional voir dire has become increasingly difficult.  Numerous courts 
across the country, citing time constraints, have either reduced the time 
allocated for voir dire or switched from attorney- to judge-conducted voir 
dire.215  Online investigations help rectify this troubling deficit in juror 
information.  And, unlike other methods of acquiring information about 
jurors such as extending voir dire, investigations do not delay or lengthen 
trials.216  Since juror investigations, even if conducted in the courtroom, 
occur outside of the normal trial process, they do not impact the overall 
length of the trial. 
Besides improving the use of peremptory challenges, juror 
investigations, especially when conducted online, help reduce the 
                                                          
 212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also JONAKAIT, supra note 39, at 149 (“Not 
surprisingly, lawyers feel that they can use peremptories more effectively when they better know the 
jury pool.”). 
 213. Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 1693 (“If the government . . . essentially provid[ed] dossiers on 
all prospective jurors, [then] one might expect to see less discrimination on the basis of race, national 
origin, religion, gender, and other immutable characteristics.”).  As one practitioner has observed: 
Yet in some ways increased juror investigation may show more respect for the 
individuality of jurors.  For years the practice of law has relied heavily on stereotypes 
during jury selection.  Data is published left and right discussing whether married 
mothers are better jurors than single women for cases against corporations, or whether 
men over 50 are good picks for a jury trial about Social Security fraud.  There is 
tremendous potential with juror research to step away from classifying individuals by 
these subcategories.  Instead, an attorney can look at a blog and say, juror 12 seems 
compassionate or juror 12 seems financially savvy.  The characteristics of the jurors are 
determined by their actions online, and not by their membership in a certain 
classification. 
Johnson, supra note 12, at 4. 
 214. Cf. Susan L. McCoin, Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of 
Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1241 (1985) (“Discriminatory practices based 
on stereotypes dilute the public confidence in the jury system.”). 
 215. New York, for example, requires that the trial judge in a civil case impose “time limitations 
for the questioning of prospective jurors during the voir dire.”  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
22, § 202.33(d) (2012). 
 216. See supra Part II.B. 
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imbalance between criminal defendants and the prosecution.217  With 
respect to information, the government traditionally held an advantage 
over the defense because the government has access to information that 
is not readily available to the general public.218  Further, government 
resources generally surpass even the most affluent defendant.219  Online 
investigations of jurors, which require far fewer resources than 
traditional investigations, offer even indigent defendants the opportunity 
to reduce this information disparity.220 
Finally, one should note that online pretrial investigations can 
improve judicial economy by limiting later appeals or claims of juror 
misconduct.  By requiring attorneys to investigate jurors before trial, the 
court may reduce the likelihood of post-verdict claims of juror 
misconduct because attorneys should discover potential issues earlier in 
the process.  At least one state has required attorneys to investigate jurors 
before trial or forego later claims of juror misconduct.221 
IV. THE DISADVANTAGES OF ONLINE JUROR INVESTIGATIONS 
 A. Juror Privacy 
 
One major concern with online juror research is the potential for 
encroachment on juror privacy.  Judge Posner recently stated that 
“[m]ost people dread jury duty—partly because of privacy concerns.”222  
Some believe that this dread will become more acute and cause the 
national jury summons reply rate to fall even lower as jurors realize that, 
in addition to answering very personal questions during voir dire, they 
must submit to online investigations.223  Others worry that online 
investigations may interfere with jurors’ abilities to perform their 
                                                          
 217. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text (discussing the imbalance created by the 
cost of traditional investigation). 
 218. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra Part II.B. 
 221. Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 554 (2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 222. United States v. Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting); see 
also Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 1694 (“Jury duty is already viewed as an unappetizing prospect for 
many Americans, and the loss of privacy associated with comprehensive government background 
checks could prompt stiff resistance and exacerbate juror absenteeism.”). 
 223. See John E. Nowak, Jury Trials and First Amendment Values in “Cyber World”, 34 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1247 (2001) (“[T]he thought that one’s entire life will be open to the 
government and public through jury service certainly may well deter most people from wanting to 
serve on a jury.”). 
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duties.224  As discussed below, these fears may be somewhat overblown, 
especially with respect to younger jurors. 
On the concept of online privacy, younger jurors, who are generally 
classified as “Digital Natives,”225 usually differ with older jurors, who 
are generally classified as “Digital Immigrants.”226  Digital Natives, as 
compared to Digital Immigrants, are less likely to be surprised or 
bothered by online investigations.227  This is not to say that Digital 
Natives are unconcerned about online privacy.  Rather, Digital Natives 
worry more about maintaining some “control over who knows what” 
about them.228  These differences between Digital Natives and Digital 
Immigrants arise in large part because of the experience each generation 
has had with the Internet.229 
Digital Natives have grown up with the Internet and are more likely 
to have been subjected to and conducted their own online 
investigations.230  As previously discussed, in the Digital Age, online 
investigations occur regularly both in and outside of the courtroom.231  In 
2009, forty-five percent of employers reported that they used social 
networking sites to screen applicants.232  Also, many in society, even 
when serving as jurors, conduct online investigations.233  Despite 
receiving admonitions from the judge, some jurors, especially Digital 
Natives, go online during the trial to find information about witnesses, 
attorneys, the judge, and the defendant.234 
                                                          
 224. United States v. White, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (D.S.D. 1999) (“In the Court’s 
experience, in a criminal drug case such as this, it is not farfetched to expect jurors to feel 
intimidated by or prejudiced toward a defendant who, they learn, has conducted an investigation of 
their personal lives by interviewing their next-door neighbors.”). 
 225. Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1, ON THE HORIZON, Sept.–Oct. 
2001, at 1, 1 (defining a Digital Native as someone who has grown up with the Internet). 
 226. Id. at 1, 3 (defining a Digital Immigrant as someone who has migrated to the Internet). 
 227. See infra notes 230–32 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency and commonality 
of online investigations). 
 228. Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Creation: Teenagers’ 
Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and Self-Expression, 10 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 
393, 404 (2008). (“This suggests a definition of privacy not tied to the disclosure of certain types of 
information, rather a definition centered on having control over who knows what about you.”). 
 229. Prensky, supra note 225, at 3 (explaining that Digital Immigrants “turn[] to the Internet for 
information second rather than first,” like Digital Natives). 
 230. Id. at 1. 
 231. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
 232. Rosemary Haefner, More Employers Screening Candidates via Social Networking Sites, 
CAREERBUILDER.COM (June 10, 2009, 4:20 PM), http://www.careerbuilder.com/Article/CB-1337-
Interview-Tips-More-Employers-Screening-Candidates-via-Social-Networking-Sites/. 
 233. Laitinen & Loynes, supra note 5, at 20. 
 234. Id. (“Attorneys also need to be mindful that jurors, especially tech-savvy millennial or 
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Another factor to consider when examining juror privacy is the 
alternative to online investigations.  Traditional investigations, which 
sometimes involved surveillance by private detectives, were in many 
ways more intrusive than online investigations.235  While an online 
investigation allows an attorney to learn more about a juror, the process 
is more discreet and less invasive.  Most web-based searches do not 
involve contacting anyone associated with the juror.236  Even if, as 
suggested below, the court informs the juror beforehand that the 
attorneys may conduct online investigations, the juror, for the most part, 
never knows whether it actually occurred.237  In contrast, field 
investigations usually involved face-to-face contact with a juror’s 
friends, neighbors, and acquaintances, which the juror could easily learn 
about.238  For many people, field investigations constitute the more 
intrusive practice.239  This may change in the future, however, as 
individuals increasingly spend and place more of their lives online.240 
Also, one should remember that much of the information sought by 
attorneys through online investigation is publicly available and has been 
placed on the Internet by the prospective juror.  Courts have consistently 
recognized that individuals have a lower expectation of privacy in 
information that they themselves make available on the Internet.241  A 
Maryland court recently noted that “[t]he act of posting information on a 
social networking site, without the poster limiting access to that 
information, makes whatever is posted available to the world at large.”242  
As for information posted about jurors by third parties, the question 
becomes whether access by attorneys should differ from access by 
others, such as landlords and employers.  Those concerned with 
                                                                                                                       
Generation Y members, will very likely use social media to research the trial lawyers, clients, and 
witnesses.”). 
 235. Redgrave & Stover, supra note 60, at 212–13. 
 236. Some websites, however, do let the user know who has visited that site.  Michael Arrington, 
See Who’s Reading Your LinkedIn Profile, TECHCRUNCH (May 10, 2007), http://techcrunch.com/ 
2007/05/10/see-whos-reading-your-linkedin-profile/. 
 237. Redgrave & Stover, supra note 60, at 217 (“The [I]nternet allows this investigation to take 
place anonymously.”). 
 238. United States v. White, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (D.S.D. 1999) (“Nor is it farfetched to 
expect at least some of the prospective jurors to have learned about an investigation conducted 
through their neighbors.”). 
 239. See BLUE & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 30, § 9:1 (“Although the jurors’ homes are out in 
public view, it feels uniquely invasive to the jurors, and the judge, when drive-bys are discovered.”). 
 240. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 1688–94 (discussing the privacy implications of 
emerging Internet technologies on jury selection). 
 241. See, e.g., Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (Md. 2009). 
 242. Id. 
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protecting juror privacy may enjoy better results by focusing their 
attention on the individuals who place the information online rather than 
those who search for it. 
Finally, telling jurors in the initial summons about the possibility and 
purpose of the investigations may somewhat diminish concerns regarding 
juror privacy.243  According to Professor Caren Morrison, informing 
jurors about online investigations will put jurors on notice and will 
“restore some autonomy to the jurors.”244  Such disclosure will allow the 
jurors to “assume responsibility for strengthening their privacy settings 
on social networking sites, temporarily suspending their blogs, and not 
posting any incendiary letters to the editor during the duration of their 
service.”245  Providing jurors with notice also addresses Digital Natives’ 
most troubling privacy concern: the ability to have some control over 
who accesses their online information.246 
B. Disclosing All Disqualifying Juror Information 
Aside from the concerns surrounding privacy and the potential drop 
in jury-participation rates, another issue—which is the focus of this 
Article—exists regarding an assumption made about the information 
uncovered by attorneys during their investigations.  Some assume that 
the discoverer will turn over to the court or release to the public all 
disqualifying juror information.  While this likely occurs in cases where 
members of the media find the information, this is not necessarily true 
for those situations in which attorneys make the discovery.247  As 
previously discussed, when attorneys investigate jurors, their goals may 
differ from merely seating an impartial jury or ensuring a fair trial.248  
Rather, some attorneys may want to remove unfavorable jurors, learn the 
interests and viewpoints of sitting jurors, or uncover grounds for an 
appeal.249 
                                                          
 243. For an example of a letter disclosing to jurors that the attorneys will research their 
backgrounds, see Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 
2011, at 4, 9. 
 244. Id. at 10. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Livingstone, supra note 228, at 404–05. 
 247. See infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text; see also Kay, supra note 8. 
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An attorney who discovers improper conduct by a juror in voir dire 
or during trial may decide not to disclose such information to the 
court.250  This is especially true if the conduct by the juror is neither 
criminal nor fraudulent and if the attorney thinks that the particular juror 
will be advantageous to her case.251  Attorneys have this option because 
few rules exist today requiring attorneys to reveal such information.252  
For example, only a small number of states make information about 
jurors subject to discovery.253  Those few states requiring disclosure of 
juror information generally place the burden solely on the prosecution.254  
The defense, however, must first initiate a discovery request, which is 
generally limited to information not found in the public domain.255 
As for an attorney’s ethical obligation to reveal such information, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct have not kept pace with the 
technological advancements brought by the Digital Age.  Further, these 
rules, for the most part, are unclear as to when an attorney must report a 
juror to the court.  The most relevant and applicable section of the Model 
Rules reads: 
                                                          
 250. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Right of Defense in Criminal Prosecution to Disclosure of 
Prosecution Information Regarding Prospective Jurors, 86 A.L.R.3d 571, 574 (1978) (citing the 
common law rule that the defense counsel in a criminal case has no right of access to the 
prosecution’s information regarding prospective jurors). 
 251. See id. (noting that courts have held that information about a prospective juror’s criminal 
record or other private information does not need to be disclosed). 
 252. But see id. (“[I]n accordance with an apparent general trend toward the expansion of 
criminal discovery, there is judicial authority in a few jurisdictions supporting a right of disclosure in 
cases involving a prospective juror’s criminal record or other private information . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 253. See, e.g., State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 138–39 (Iowa 1987) (en banc) (limiting 
access to juror information by county attorneys and requiring county attorneys to disclose to the 
defense any juror information obtained); Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Mass. 
1966) (allowing the defense access to juror information obtained by the government); Ghent, supra 
note 250, at 574. 
 254. See Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d at 139 (requiring prosecutors to disclose to the defendant any 
rap sheets on jurors acquired by court order). 
 255. See Ghent, supra note 250, at 574–75 (“Rule 421(a) of the Uniform Rules of Criminal 
Procedure makes it the duty of the prosecuting attorney, on the defendant’s written request . . . , to 
allow access at any reasonable time to . . . ‘reports on prospective jurors.’”).  Jurisdictions not 
requiring the release of such information by the prosecutor to defense counsel include Florida, 
Louisiana, and Texas.  See Monahan v. State, 294 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) 
(holding that the trial court did not err in denying the criminal defendant’s request for discovery of 
juror records); State v. Jackson, 450 So. 2d 621, 628–29 (La. 1984) (denying defendant’s appeal 
because the records did not impact his voir dire), superseded on other grounds by rule, LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. art. 404(B)(1) (2011); Martin v. State, 577 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) 
(“The State has no obligation to furnish counsel for accused with information he has in regard to 
prospective jurors.” (quoting Linebarger v. State, 469 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971))). 
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Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal 
or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative 
process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully 
communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant 
in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or 
other evidence[,] or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when 
required by law to do so.256 
Applying this rule to two real-life situations demonstrates the lack of 
consistent ethical guidance in this area.  The first is the case of Jose 
Padilla,257 which presents a routine example of juror dishonesty.  During 
voir dire, several of Mr. Padilla’s attorneys ran internet searches on 
prospective jurors as they were called to sit in the jury box.258  One 
defense attorney discovered that a prospective juror had misled the court 
about her involvement with the criminal justice system.259  The attorney 
disclosed the issue, and the court removed the prospective juror from the 
venire.260 
Applying comment 12 of Rule 3.3 to Mr. Padilla’s case, it appears 
that the defense team, upon learning of the juror’s dishonest statement, 
had an ethical duty to inform the court of the information because it was 
fraudulent.261  Thus, the ulterior motives of the defense team, such as the 
desire to remove a potential guilty vote, were irrelevant because the 
attorney had an obligation to report the juror’s misconduct. 
The second scenario involves the previously discussed juror from 
Michigan who posted information about the defendant on her Facebook 
page.262  In applying comment 12 of Rule 3.3 to this scenario, neither the 
defense counsel nor the prosecutor had an ethical duty to disclose the 
juror’s Facebook post to the court.263  The juror did not commit a fraud 
or a crime, even though the conduct was improper.  This juror, like many  
 
                                                          
 256. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2008). 
 257. United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4180847 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2007).  
In Hassoun, the trial judge granted the attorneys much leeway during voir dire and allowed them to 
use a large number of peremptory strikes.  Id. at *3 n.11–12. 
 258. Kay, supra note 8. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2008) (noting that Rule 3.3 
“requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever 
the lawyer knows that a person . . . intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding”). 
 262. Cook, supra note 17. 
 263. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2008). 
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jurors before her, determined the defendant’s fate prior to hearing all the 
evidence. 
One may argue that this juror’s actions were in contempt of court 
and, thus, the attorneys had an obligation to report it.  This argument, 
however, is very tenuous and requires several assumptions.  First, one 
must assume that the judge indeed told jurors to refrain from posting 
thoughts about the case online.264  Second, one must also assume that the 
judge clearly and accurately instructed the jurors.  Third, one must 
assume that the juror understood the instructions and purposefully 
violated the court’s order.265 
Mr. Padilla’s case and the Michigan case illustrate the disparate 
results that may occur under the current Model Rules.  As online 
investigations continue to grow in popularity,266 it is highly likely that 
similar examples will arise in the future.  At present, the legal system 
lacks adequate safeguards to ensure that attorneys disclose all 
disqualifying juror information.  The next section of this Article will 
examine two proposals to rectify this problem. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The two proposed solutions examined in this section require 
attorneys to disclose certain information uncovered about jurors either to 
the court or opposing counsel.  The first proposal involves a change to 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  The second advocates a 
change to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and state analogues.  
Prior to examining these solutions, however, this Article will briefly 
discuss the merits of requiring attorneys to disclose information 
discovered about jurors. 
                                                          
 264. At present, many jurisdictions have not updated their jury instructions to keep up with 
changes brought by the Digital Age.  Eric P. Robinson, Jury Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-
State Survey of Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 
307, 307–08 (2011). 
 265. See, e.g., In re Stoelting, 784 F. Supp. 886, 886 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding a juror in 
contempt and imposing a $250 fine because she violated the court’s instructions by watching the 
news concerning the case, forming an opinion on the case, and expressing it to another juror). 
 266. See Hopkins, supra note 31, at 13–14 (describing the rise of web-based research options). 
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A. Reasons to Mandate Disclosure 
The strongest argument for mandating disclosure is fairness.267  Both 
the criminal defendant and the government have a right to a fair trial.268  
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]ne touchstone of a fair trial is 
an impartial trier of fact.”269  The term “impartial” can at times be 
difficult to define, especially as applied to jurors.270  One indicator of 
impartiality is the ability to keep an open mind during the presentation of 
the evidence.271 
In applying this standard to the conduct of the Michigan juror who 
posted comments about the trial on Facebook, it becomes fairly clear that 
she was not impartial.  After one day of trial in which she heard only the 
prosecutor’s evidence, the juror was not only ready to convict the 
defendant but also relished the opportunity to do so.272  Permitting a juror 
like her to remain on the panel threatens the concept of an impartial jury 
and does little to facilitate the search for truth.  Mandating disclosure of 
her actions protects impartiality. 
Disclosure of juror information also helps level the playing field.  
This is especially true for defendants because juror investigations have 
historically favored the prosecution.273  Although the Internet 
significantly reduces this disparity by lowering the barriers to 
information, the gap still exists.274  For example, prosecutors still have 
access to information unavailable to the general public,275 and they are 
more likely than defense counsel to maintain jury books.276 
                                                          
 267. Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1034–35 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); People v. Aldridge, 
209 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973), invalidated by People v. McIntosh, 252 N.W.2d 779 
(Mich. 1977), overruled by People v. Weeder, 674 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 2004) (per curiam). 
 268. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (“[T]he 
Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a 
conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to 
produce a fair result.”). 
 269. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984). 
 270. Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict Interview of 
Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 525–26 (1997). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 273. Ashby, supra note 92, at 1154–55 (describing prosecutors’ use of various law enforcement 
agencies when collecting information about potential jurors). 
 274. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 275. See United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1958) (“The appellant contends 
that the trial was unfair in that in exercising its challenges the Government had access to information 
not available to him or to even the wealthiest defendant.”). 
 276. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
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While there will always be some level of inequity in any adversarial 
process, the legal system should work to reduce the imbalance as much 
as possible.277  At present, some attorneys remain unaware of juror 
investigations, while others simply lack the resources to perform such 
research.278  One of the reasons Jose Padilla’s legal team discovered the 
untruthful juror during voir dire is that it had the personnel to conduct the 
investigation, which is not always the case for criminal defense 
attorneys.279  Requiring the disclosure of juror information helps reduce 
the inequality between parties. 
Finally, disclosure helps maintain society’s confidence in the legal 
system.  This occurs in two distinct ways.  First, requiring attorneys to 
disclose information discovered about jurors demonstrates that online 
investigations are not used solely to benefit one attorney over another or 
as a litigation tactic.  Second, allowing concealment of juror information 
discovered by attorneys may lead some to question the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice process and ask whether a criminal trial is more about 
finding information on jurors than a search for the truth.280  One legal 
commentator has noted that “[w]hen both the prosecution and the 
defense can resist discovery of juror information, it is possible for 
members of the community to view the result of the trial as dependent 
upon which side enjoyed the advantage of juror information rather than 
upon impartial jury deliberations.”281  
Those opposing disclosure of juror information in criminal 
proceedings suggest that it is contrary to the nature of the adversarial 
process.282  This antiquated argument does not reflect the modern trend in 
criminal procedure to allow broad disclosure in the form of discovery.283  
Furthermore, this argument, traditionally applied to information about 
                                                          
 277. Babcock, supra note 110, at 562. 
 278. Professor Hans Zeisel, a jury research expert, identified this potential problem with juror 
research by observing that “I hate things that benefit the richer side . . . .   One side obtains an 
advantage over the other.  If this thing gets out of hand, [then] the courts might begin to say that you 
have to disclose whatever you have learned to the other side.”  Tamar Lewin, Business and the Law; 
Jury Research: Ethics Argued, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1982, at D2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 279. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Justin Mayo, Frustrated Attorney: ‘You Just Can’t Help 
People,’ SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/ 
unequaldefense/stories/three (detailing a public defender’s overwhelming caseload). 
 280. See Moskitis, supra note 175, at 633–34.  Such concealment “creat[es] the appearance of 
bias” and “erodes community confidence in the jury trial as part of the administration of criminal 
justice.”  Id. 
 281. Id. at 626. 
 282. See id. at 627. 
 283. See id. at 629 (discussing the “liberaliz[ation of] criminal discovery”). 
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witnesses and defendants, lacks support in the context of information 
about jurors.  First, as discussed below, the proposals suggested in this 
Article are not a “one-way street.”  Rather, they require disclosure by 
both the prosecution and defense.284  Second, revealing information 
about jurors, as opposed to information about witnesses, neither puts any 
individual in harm’s way nor facilitates or encourages parties to fabricate 
evidence.285 
The work-product privilege provides the strongest argument against 
revealing juror information obtained by attorneys.286  Generally speaking, 
this privilege prevents the disclosure of an attorney’s opinions, theories, 
or conclusions of law to opposing counsel.287  Even assuming that the 
disqualifying juror information fell under the work-product privilege, the 
privilege is qualified, not absolute.288  Thus, the court could override the 
privilege.  Also, the work-product privilege should not serve as 
justification for an attorney to withhold information crucial to 
empaneling and maintaining an impartial jury, just as it would not 
prevent the prosecution from disclosing exculpatory information to the 
defense.289 
B. Methods for Enforcing Disclosure 
1. Amending the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
One possible solution to the problem identified in Part IV.B of this 
Article is to modify the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  For 
example, an amendment to comment 12 of Rule 3.3 could require 
attorneys to disclose any improper conduct by jurors.  Some states, like  
 
                                                          
 284. David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 
58 (1961) (arguing that “any just system of discovery presupposes its equal availability to all 
adversaries”). 
 285. See Moskitis, supra note 175, at 628 (stating that information in pre-voir dire discovery 
rarely relates to the defendant). 
 286. Ghent, supra note 250, at 576 (“One of the most successful prosecution arguments . . . , 
although it has not always been made, is that the information sought was protected from disclosure 
because it was the prosecutor’s ‘work product.’”). 
 287. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 288. See id. (allowing that a showing of “substantial need” and “undue hardship” will overcome 
the privilege). 
 289. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). 
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Tennessee, have taken such action.290  Other states have looked to Model 
Rule 3.5 and modified it to cover acts of juror misconduct.291 
The main concerns with relying on ethical rules are institutional 
competence and enforcement.292  State bar authorities have very little 
experience dealing with jurors.  This in turn makes it difficult for the bar 
to determine what information that attorneys uncover about jurors falls 
within the disclosure requirements.  In contrast, the courts regularly deal 
with jurors, and judges routinely interact with them.293  More 
importantly, judges, after reading a juror’s questionnaire and hearing a 
juror’s answers during voir dire, regularly determine whether a particular 
juror can be impartial or whether an attorney may challenge that juror for 
cause.294 
Besides the judge’s unique relationship with jurors, there is the issue 
of enforcement.  Courts handle attorney disclosure daily through 
discovery.295  It is the rare criminal case where attorneys do not disclose 
information through this process.  As a result, courts have established  
“case law and rules of procedure specifically tailored to redress any 
discovery violations.”296 
In contrast, the state bar has very little practice in this area.  
Moreover, the bar has hesitated to investigate, much less enforce, 
criminal discovery rule violations.297  In sum, the rules of ethics are a 
good start, at least for those states that have taken those steps.  The rules  
 
                                                          
 290. Tennessee is one of the few states that has a much more expansive rule.  TENN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(i) (2011) (“A lawyer who, prior to conclusion of the proceeding, comes to 
know of improper conduct by or toward a juror or a member of the jury pool shall report the 
improper conduct to the tribunal, even if so doing requires the disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by [the attorney’s duty of confidentiality].”). 
 291. See, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(f) (2011) (“A lawyer shall reveal 
promptly to the court improper conduct by, or by another toward, a juror or prospective juror or a 
member of the family thereof, of which the lawyer has knowledge.”). 
 292. R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of 
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1460–65 (2011). 
 293. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 173–79 
(2008) (discussing the relationship between judge and jury). 
 294. Id. at 176 (citing 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 2482 (3d ed. 2008)).  In fact, the Supreme Court has even deferred to a trial 
judge’s determinations of impartiality.  Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 433 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (acknowledging past decisions allowing “special deference” in this context (quoting 
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 295. In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1173–74 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Cassidy, supra note 292, at 1460–61. 
HOFFMEISTER FINAL 4/19/2012  2:13 PM 
2012] INVESTIGATING JURORS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 647 
of discovery, however, provide the most effective tool to ensure 
disclosure of juror information. 
2. Modifying the Rules of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and State Analogues 
The second possible solution, and the one favored by this Article, is 
to modify the rules of criminal procedure and subject information about 
jurors to the rules of discovery.  The new rule proposed by this Article 
would read as follows:  
Any attorney who discovers or learns of information before, during, or 
after trial that would disqualify a juror from serving, or serve as 
sufficient grounds for challenging the juror for cause, shall turn over 
such information to the opposing party. 
This rule requires attorneys to treat information uncovered about jurors 
like other discovery material.  For example, a defense attorney—in 
addition to requesting that the prosecution turn over witness statements, 
police reports, physical examinations, and other discoverable evidence—
might also seek discovery of “any and all information uncovered about 
the jury venire to support a challenge for cause.”  The government could 
make a similar request in its reciprocal discovery motion because this 
rule applies equally to both sides. 
This rule is not all encompassing, however.  In fact, the rule would 
not impact most of the information uncovered about jurors.  This is 
because it covers only select juror information.  To be discoverable, the 
information must be significant enough to support a challenge for cause 
or otherwise disqualify the juror. 
A more comprehensive rule that covered all juror information 
discovered by an attorney would arguably further reduce the inequality 
that can arise when only one side investigates jurors.298  Complete 
disclosure would also likely strengthen community support for the trial 
process and ease some of the privacy concerns that arise with online 
investigations.299  Creating such a broad rule, however, has serious 
collateral consequences.  Most noticeably, requiring the disclosure of all 
                                                          
 298. See Moskitis, supra note 175, at 607–24 (discussing many of the issues associated with 
investigations conducted by only one side); see also Nowak, supra note 223, at 1225 (“The attorney 
with information about cyber activities of potential jurors will be able to use jury challenges for 
cause, and use preemptive challenges, in a strategically wise manner.”). 
 299. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text. 
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juror information will deter attorneys from even conducting 
investigations.300  Attorneys will have little incentive to investigate jurors 
if they must reveal all of the information uncovered to opposing 
counsel.301  This in turn harms attorneys and the legal system as a whole 
because online investigations are beneficial to both.302 
The rule proposed by this Article is a compromise among competing 
interests.  It is narrowly tailored to keep attorneys interested in 
conducting online investigations, while sufficiently broad to prevent 
attorneys from concealing information about biased or partial jurors who 
should not serve. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Digital Age, through its advancements in technology, has both 
resurrected and reshaped the practice of investigating jurors.  No longer 
is it restricted to high-profile cases or affluent clients.  Nor is it used 
merely for purposes of jury selection.  Today, attorneys routinely gather 
a wide assortment of information about jurors for use at different stages 
of the trial. 
While some see online investigation as an intrusion into jurors’ 
personal lives, others believe attorneys, like everyone else, should have 
access to this information, especially when it is in the public domain.  
Proponents of this practice point to its tremendous upside and claim that 
the information uncovered will increase the likelihood of empaneling 
impartial jurors.  In addition, they argue that online investigations reduce 
instances of juror misconduct.  This point incorrectly assumes attorneys 
will disclose all disqualifying information about jurors.  Subjecting such 
information to the rules of discovery will correct this misconception and 
help curb some of the criticism aimed at the investigation of jurors. 
                                                          
 300. GOBERT ET AL., supra note 81, § 5:12 (“One negative effect of allowing discovery of juror 
investigations by consultants is that it might have an inhibitory effect on using jury consultants and 
social science experts in jury selection.  If discovery were ordered, then the advantage to be gained 
might no longer be seen as justifying the expense.”). 
 301. Id. 
 302. See supra Part III. 
